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Adolf A. Berle’s early career straddles two sides of a transition that 
occurred in policy advocacy coalitions in the United States between the 
end of World War I and the coming of the New Deal. In the first years 
after the Armistice, the leading advocates for state-building reforms at the 
national level were corporate lawyers and their allies in corporate finance. 
By the late 1920s, however, the corporate lawyers had largely retreated 
from the scene, replaced by academic experts employed at 
philanthropically funded organizations. In this context, Berle himself was 
a sort of hybrid actor, representing both sides of this transition. He started 
the decade as a dedicated member of the corporate bar. Although he 
maintained his corporate law practice throughout this period, by the end 
of the 1920s he was drafting The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, a foundation-funded academic critique of corporate power.1 
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There is a peculiar disconnect between the way specialists view the 
1920s and the way the decade is understood by non-specialists and the 
general public. Casual observers tend to view the 1920s as a conservative 
or reactionary interlude between the watershed reform periods of the 
Progressive Era and New Deal. Although many scholars have abandoned 
the traditional view of the 1920s, their work has not yet penetrated the 
generalizations of non-specialists.2 Even readers familiar with specialist 
accounts portraying the New Era as the age of “corporate liberalism” or 
the “Associative State” tend to view these concepts as just another way 
that business influence forestalled the development of a social-democratic 
state in this period, providing an example of the way that corporate elites 
favored only those innovations that were viewed as good for business. 
However, several scholars have recently begun to move beyond these 
older interpretations and view developments in the 1920s on their own 
terms by exploring topics such as the development of administrative law, 
the local political activism of business leaders, and the collaboration 
between federal administrators, business leaders, and academic 
researchers.3 
This Article builds on that interpretive shift by examining the actions 
of some of the leading corporate lawyers and financiers during the years 
after the Great War, specifically focusing on the origins and activities of 
the National Budget Committee (NBC). The NBC was formed in 1919 to 
lead the effort to enact a national budget system in the United States. The 
composition of the NBC, and its success in securing passage of the Budget 
and Accounting Act in 1921, illustrates the central role played by 
corporate elites in debates about administrative reform in these years. 
Although Berle himself was not directly involved in these debates, 
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examining the NBC’s rise and fall helps to illuminate the world in which 
his early work was developed. 
The overwhelming question that troubled policymakers and policy 
advocates in the immediate aftermath of the Armistice was the nation’s 
rapidly ballooning national debt. When the United States entered the war 
in April 1917, the debt stood at just over $1 billion. In less than two years 
that amount had grown to more than $20 billion.4 For a certain segment of 
the corporate elite, however, the debt crisis seemed to present an 
opportunity. Widespread anxiety over the debt, they believed, would make 
it possible to rouse public support for the centerpiece of their agenda. 
Perhaps, with the carrot of good government now accompanied by the 
stick of possible debt-triggered tax increases, corporate-elite advocates of 
administrative reform could leverage the sense of fear and crisis that 
surrounded the war debt into popular support for some of their old plans. 
“I think this is really a psychological time to push through a budget 
system,” former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson wrote to a colleague. 
“The country is facing a financial burden incomparably greater than 
anything it has ever had before and the pressure which this burden 
produces will create a demand for better financial methods. That demand 
ought to be steered at once into the right channels of the budget.”5 And so, 
in the early weeks of 1919, during the winter that followed the Armistice, 
in wood-paneled rooms in Manhattan, an informal group of corporate 
elites kept warm, talking of budget reform. William Howard Taft led a 
series of conversations in several private clubs in New York City, where 
he and his associates discussed ways to take advantage of the new 
situation.6 
Existing scholarship on the creation of the national budget system 
has tended to treat the passage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 
as a near-inevitable result of a postwar consensus. However, the need to 
respond to this crisis after World War I actually brought a climax to a 
fierce but little-noted debate among proponents of three proposals. First, 
many Southern and Western Congressmen preferred a Congressional 
budget. They hoped to restore the division of power that had prevailed 
during the nineteenth century, when the executive branch was viewed as a 
collection of bureaus that owed direct responsibility to Congress, and 
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when Congressmen were generally able to tell executive branch officials 
what to do and how to do it. Second, Wilsonian Democrats and some 
opportunistic Republicans favored a Treasury budget. In this system, the 
Secretary of the Treasury would act as a broker between the president and 
Congress in managing the budget process. Building on the Treasury 
Secretary’s traditionally close relationship with Congress, this system 
would preserve a role for Congress in formulating the budget and 
managing its administration. Finally, corporate elites such as Taft and his 
associates favored a third option, the Presidential budget. They believed 
that the President should take responsibility for managing public 
administration at the national level and have a planning staff to assist him 
in doing the job. Under a Presidential budget system, the President would 
be in charge of making the budget and Congress would approve or reject 
that budget. Under this system, the role of Congress in national 
administration would be limited to observing and critiquing the executive 
branch once Congress had approved the President’s course of action.7 
Although this aspect of his career is not well remembered today, 
during the first quarter of the twentieth century Taft was widely regarded 
as an expert in budgeting and public administration. This expertise 
emerged primarily from his own work in government, particularly during 
his time as Governor-General of the Philippines and as Secretary of War. 
Taft solidified this reputation during his presidency when he convened the 
President’s Commission on Economy and Efficiency (known as the “Taft 
Commission”) to investigate possibilities for administrative reform. 
Among the celebrated achievements of the Taft Commission was the 
creation of the first organizational chart depicting the administrative 
structure of the executive branch. The commission also drew up plans for 
a national budget system, but these had gathered dust through the 1910s 
after Democrats in Congress cancelled the commission’s funding and 
Woodrow Wilson refused to continue its work.8 
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The other two leaders joining Taft in his post-Armistice budget 
discussions were Charles D. Norton and William F. Willoughby. Both 
men had contributed substantially to the work of the Taft Commission. 
Norton left a lucrative position as an insurance executive in Chicago in 
1909 to serve as the President’s personal secretary. In Washington, Norton 
organized the Taft Commission, selected its staff, and supervised its work. 
When Taft’s presidency came to its end in 1913, Norton moved to New 
York, became a vice-president of the Morgan-affiliated First National 
Bank of New York, and served as a director for several large corporations. 
Although Norton hailed from the wilds of Wisconsin, he had business and 
family connections among the Northeast establishment. His own ancestry 
traced back to Puritan New England and his wife was a granddaughter of 
the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison.9 
Willoughby, today considered to be one of the founders of the 
academic field of public administration, had been one of the Taft 
Commission’s primary researchers. Before joining the commission, he had 
filled administrative posts in Puerto Rico, and was assistant director of the 
U.S. Census in 1910. After the commission was dissolved, Willoughby 
became director of the Institute for Government Research (IGR), which 
had been formed in 1914 by Norton and other veterans of the Taft 
Administration to continue the work of the Taft Commission. In 1927, the 
IGR would merge with two other research organizations to form the 
Brookings Institution. As director of the IGR in the late 1910s, Willoughby 
published a series of books on budget reform and executive 
reorganization.10 
Taft, Norton, and Willoughby decided that the first step toward 
enacting budget reform would be to form a new organization to 
supplement the activity of the IGR. The IGR was an effective research 
organization, but the limitations imposed by its funders restricted its ability 
to advocate specific reforms. For a time, Taft and his allies had hoped that 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (USCC) could fill this role. The USCC 
had a broad membership and weight in public debates, but its membership 
was so diverse that it could not easily take stands on issues or advocate 
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particular proposals. Especially on the budget issue, the consensus among 
the USCC’s Northeastern establishment leaders in favor of the Taft 
Commission’s recommendations clashed with regional and sectoral 
business leaders who questioned the desirability of concentrated power in 
the federal executive branch.11 Taft, Norton, and Willoughby decided the 
budget movement required a respectable “propaganda organization” that 
could build political support for their plans. This new organization should 
be led by representatives of the corporate elite, but it should not be so large 
that its actions would be crippled by referenda and discord as the actions 
of the USCC often were. 
Taft, Norton, and Willoughby selected John Teele Pratt to lead the 
new organization. A corporate lawyer, financier, and one of the wealthiest 
men working on Wall Street, Pratt was one of a small number in this era 
who could comfortably address letters to John D. Rockefeller, Jr., with the 
greeting “Dear John”—although he was not quite as wealthy as 
Rockefeller. In the mid-1920s, Pratt’s estate was valued at about $9 
million.12 While this was relatively small compared to Rockefeller’s 
fortune, as a share of GDP, Pratt’s wealth was equivalent to about $1.77 
billion in 2015 dollars. John T. Pratt’s father was Charles Pratt, one of the 
original nine trustees in the Standard Oil Trust. One of John T. Pratt’s 
brothers was a director of Standard Oil of New Jersey; another brother was 
head of Standard Oil of New York. Before the war, John T. Pratt was a 
director of the Universal Military Training League, a preparedness 
organization backed by members of the corporate elite. During the war, he 
was Associate Director (and the major financial backer) of the Public 
Service Reserve in the Department of Labor, and then served in Paris as 
General Manager of the Department of Military Affairs in the American 
Red Cross. After returning from Paris, Pratt settled back into his law 
practice and started a new firm specializing in management consulting and 
corporate reorganization.13 “Of medium height, and slightly built,” as one 
fawning journalist described Pratt, “he typifies the successful American 
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man of affairs—alert, accurate and incisive.”14 With a reputation for 
energy, action, and “an electric personality,” Pratt seemed an ideal choice 
for this role.15 
In March 1919, Pratt produced a self-published pamphlet titled, An 
Executive Budget System: What the Country Has Done, What the Country 
Can, and Should Do.16 In the pamphlet, Pratt explained that the existing 
budgeting system was essentially the same as the one that was in force in 
the nineteenth century, when bureau chiefs and Congressional committee 
chairmen calculated expenditures with no formal oversight from the 
President. If the nation continued without modern budgeting, Pratt warned, 
the war debt would inevitably lead to higher taxes. “A war debt of over 
twenty billion dollars, the necessity of raising annually over three billion 
dollars in taxes, and the tendency to constantly increase the number and 
scope of governmental activities, has led to the publication of this little 
pamphlet,” Pratt explained.17 “The national government must do its part in 
reducing the present obligations by operating the affairs of this country on 
a plan that is sound and businesslike.”18 By “businesslike,” Pratt had in 
mind the basic plan that had been proposed by the Taft Commission and 
modeled on the basic structure of corporate governance, with the executive 
in charge of planning and implementing policy and the board of directors 
in control of the purse strings but without direct administrative authority. 
Transferring this model to the federal government, Pratt argued that “the 
President is the executive and administrative leader of the nation,”19 and 
that “in the executive administration of governmental activities, Congress 
is a critic, not an actor. It supplies the money, but is not responsible for 
administrating its expenditure.”20 Under this plan, the President would be 
responsible for preparing “a complete work-plan of the Administration, 
with estimates of revenue and expenditures to carry it out.”21 A single 
House committee and a single Senate committee would approve or 
disapprove of that budget. Congress would also be responsible for 
“enforcing a system of audits and reports, which will enable Congress 
intelligently to supervise the work of the Administration.”22 
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Shortly after his pamphlet appeared, Pratt was named chairman of a 
five-man organization committee for the group, which was to be called the 
National Budget Committee. The four who joined Pratt on the committee 
were Benjamin Strong, Paul M. Warburg, Joseph P. Cotton, and Henry L. 
Stimson—all well-known both on Wall Street and in the nation’s capital. 
Strong and Warburg were two of the most important bankers in New York; 
Cotton and Stimson were two of Wall Street’s most respected corporate 
lawyers. Benjamin Strong, the governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, had been president of the Morgan-dominated Bankers Trust. 
His father-in-law was the Morgan banking associate Edmund Cogswell 
Converse.23 During the war, Strong served as Chairman of the Liberty 
Loan Committee.24 Paul Warburg was celebrated (and reviled, by some) 
for formulating the original, Wall Street-friendly “Aldrich Plan” for the 
U.S. Federal Reserve system. Born into a prominent Jewish banking 
family in Hamburg, Germany, he had settled in New York in 1902, joining 
Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the banking firm founded by his wife’s father, 
Solomon Loeb, and her uncle, Abraham Kuhn, and run by her brother-in-
law, Jacob Schiff.25 Joseph Cotton, formerly a partner at the firm of 
Cravath & Henderson, was considered by Joseph Beal to have been “the 
best man in the class” of 1900 at Harvard Law, and Learned Hand 
considered Cotton to be the best student of his “whole generation.”26 
During the war, Cotton had been Herbert Hoover’s “right hand man” at 
the U.S. Food Administration.27 Henry Stimson was the member of the 
committee with the most experience in government and the most 
recognized expertise with budgetary reform. A protégé of the renowned 
corporate-lawyer-turned-statesman Elihu Root, Stimson had followed his 
mentor’s path from a lucrative corporate practice into public service, 
serving as U.S. Attorney under Roosevelt and Secretary of War under Taft. 
His reputation as an expert in budgetary matters stemmed from his 
                                                     
 23. See LIAQUAT AHAMED, LORDS OF FINANCE: THE BANKERS WHO BROKE THE WORLD 50 
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chairmanship of the finance committee at the 1915 New York State 
constitutional convention.28 
By the end of the summer in 1919, the National Budget Committee 
was ready to launch its propaganda campaign. After incorporating in 
Washington, D.C., and hiring a salaried executive secretary, the committee 
published the first issue of its twice-monthly newsletter, The National 
Budget, on September 1 with text written and produced by the public 
relations firm of John Price Jones.29 A former employee at the H.K. 
McCann Company (one of the predecessors of the renowned McCann 
Erickson firm), Jones was the go-to publicity man for corporate-elite 
endeavors in this era. He had previously directed publicity for the Liberty 
Loan drives and also served as general manager of the Harvard 
Endowment Fund.30 
The committee’s message received its widest hearing, however, 
through a two-part article written by Henry Stimson that appeared in the 
August and September issues of the popular magazine World’s Work—
edited by Stimson’s friend, Arthur W. Page.31 In the article, Stimson 
presented a clear case for the budget plan that John T. Pratt had outlined 
in his self-published pamphlet in the spring: the President would devise 
the budget, Congress would approve or disapprove of that budget, and then 
an independent auditing agency responsible to Congress would assess 
whether the President had faithfully carried out his plans.32 Stimson took 
the opportunity to go beyond merely discussing the budget, however, and 
outlined his vision for what he and his mentor Elihu Root liked to call 
“responsible government.”33 By fixing the responsibility for public 
administration in the President’s Office, by clarifying Congress’s role as 
critic of the President’s program, and by ensuring that debate and criticism 
of that program was conducted in public, the budget system—Stimson 
argued—would help voters discern who was responsible for the success or 
failure of a given policy.34 In this way, Stimson hoped, his plan would 
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strengthen central authority at the national level while also strengthening 
democracy.35 
Stimson preemptively dismissed the arguments of those who 
advocated placing the Budget Bureau in the Department of the Treasury 
rather than in the Office of the President. “Of course,” Stimson wrote, “the 
President would not do it all himself. He would not pass upon the infinite 
number of details which enter into it, but his power must be behind the 
budget and only his power will suffice.”36 Stimson argued that placing the 
Budget Bureau directly under the President would allow it to fill the role 
of a presidential staff agency, which in turn would enable the President to 
efficiently enact national policy. Stimson explained further that the budget 
office would provide “the necessary expert and clerical assistance [sic] 
who will serve as the machinery with which the President renders easily 
and intelligently his decisions between the different departments.”37 
While, at certain points, Stimson emphasized budgetary savings as 
the chief rationale for budget reform, he took care to argue that cutting 
expenditures was not an end in itself. He cautioned his readers that big 
government was here to stay. The real challenge, Stimson argued, was not 
to shrink the government but rather to ensure that big government was 
rendered effective and efficient: 
We may as well recognize that legitimate pressure on the 
Government to enlarge its activities will not cease. Our population is 
increasing; our communities and methods of business are constantly 
growing more complex; more government and newer forms of 
government are being made necessary; every year legitimate 
expenses are bound to increase. There can be no going backward into 
the simpler times of old.38 
Stimson also took care to couch his argument in business terms. He 
insisted that the need for a Presidential budget system should be clear to 
“every business man who is acquainted with corporate activities.”39 The 
rationale for placing budgetary authority directly under the President, he 
argued, derived from basic business principles. “How long would the 
president of a corporation stay in office if he failed to present a plan of 
work for the coming year to his Board of Directors and left it to them to 
worry out of him the facts and reports which he should present,” Stimson 
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asked.40 “Such a work-programme must normally come from the executive 
head of any organized human activity.”41 
Stimson’s article was timed to coincide with hearings before the 
House Select Committee on the Budget—hearings jointly organized by the 
NBC and the IGR—to consider a budget Bill drafted by William F. 
Willoughby of the IGR with input from the NBC and sponsored by the 
chairman of the House budget committee, James W. Good, Republican of 
Iowa.42 The “Good Bill”—as it would be known—largely followed the 
lines promoted by the NBC: the President would devise the budget, 
Congress would approve or disapprove of that budget, and then an 
independent auditing agency responsible to Congress would assess 
whether the President had faithfully carried out his plans.43 
The Bill’s advocates emphasized that their ideas were derived from 
standard models of corporate governance. Stimson told the House 
committee that the problem with the federal government was that “in 
common public matters we were not following the principles which we 
were in our private business.”44 Arguing against the Congressional and 
Treasury plans, Stimson asserted that budget planning must be done by 
“that branch of the Government which has charge of the doing of the 
work. . . . It must, therefore, be done by the Executive, just as in the case 
of any large corporation.”45 
Charles D. Norton, the former personal secretary to President Taft, 
told the House committee that the budget “should be initiated and 
submitted by the executives who are to carry the projects out” because “[i]t 
is the way it is done in business generally.”46 Norton observed that “there 
is not a single business corporation that I have observed closely that is not 
run along the lines of the Good Bill prepared by your committee.”47 When 
an incredulous Congressman challenged Norton’s business analogy by 
asking: “Do you know of any business organization that has three 
heads?”48 Norton replied, 
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I know of many businesses where the executive, after he has made a 
given plan, is content to abide by the judgment of his board, even if 
it is negatived or partially negatived, or is content to abide by the 
advice of his counsel, without feeling that his usefulness has been 
impaired.49 
Representative Good elaborated on Norton’s response by refining the 
analogy still further, asking: “[I]sn’t, after all, every business organization 
controlled by three heads?”50 “[F]irst, the president makes an estimate of 
a budget; the board of directors then assumes responsibility of 
approving . . . and after all the determination rests with its legal aspects as 
defined by the general counsel of the organization . . . .”51 Finally, for the 
benefit of his fellow committee members, Good restated Norton’s point: 
“If I understand your position, Mr. Norton, it is this: That we ought, so far 
as possible, to adopt those methods that all successful business 
organizations have adopted with reference to the finances of the 
Government.”52 
The National Budget Committee’s proposal for a Presidential budget 
system was not the only plan up for debate in 1919. The provisions of the 
Good Bill initially faced fierce opposition from advocates of a 
Congressional budget. However, the NBC was able to neutralize 
advocates for a Congressional budget and the House hearings served the 
intended purpose for the National Budget Committee and the Institute for 
Government Research, building a consensus in favor of some form of 
budget reform. 
Days after the House hearings adjourned, the Good Bill passed easily 
on October 21 by a margin of 283 to 3 (with 143 not voting).53 However, 
while this was a victory for the idea of creating a Budget Bureau in the 
executive branch, the passage of the Good Bill sparked a new counter-
proposal intended to preserve a congressional role in the budget process 
and limit the Budget Bureau’s ability to serve as a presidential staff 
agency. For the NBC, this new proposal was particularly worrisome 
because it had the backing of President Wilson. 
The Wilson Administration’s preferred plan was embodied in the Bill 
introduced by the chairman of the Senate budget committee, Medill 
McCormick, Republican of Illinois. The McCormick Bill and the Good 
Bill differed significantly in their major provisions. In contrast to the Good 
Bill, which placed the proposed Budget Bureau in the Office of the 
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President, the McCormick Bill would create a Budget Bureau in the 
Department of the Treasury. In contrast to the Good Bill, which called for 
creating an independent auditing agency, the McCormick Bill would leave 
the auditing function within the Treasury.54 The two bills also differed in 
their origins. Where the Good Bill had been written by William F. 
Willoughby of the Institute for Government Research, embodying the 
preferences of the National Budget Committee, the McCormick Bill was 
written by Charles Wallace Collins, at that time a researcher employed at 
the Library of Congress, at the direction of Carter Glass, the Secretary of 
the Treasury.55 
The alliance between Glass and McCormick (bitter opponents on 
other issues) underscores the ways that the budget debate cut across the 
traditionally identified fault lines in early twentieth century politics. In late 
1919 and early 1920, Secretary Glass and Senator McCormick made a 
concerted private lobbying campaign intended to convince the leaders of 
the National Budget Committee to support the McCormick Bill rather than 
the Good Bill, arguing that backing the McCormick plan was the only sure 
way to overcome Congressional opposition to a national budget system. 
In public statements, however, Glass, McCormick, and their allies worked 
to encourage opposition to the Good Bill by warning about the dangers of 
creating a powerful Budget Bureau in the Office of the President and 
raising the specter of a corporate conspiracy. This idea was raised at the 
House hearings by William H. Allen, who was director of the Institute of 
Public Service, a municipal research organization he had formed after 
quitting his position as co-director of the Bureau of Municipal Research in 
1914 to protest donations from the Rockefeller Foundation. Referring to 
the National Budget Committee, Allen asserted that the Good Bill would 
put power “in the hands of a permanent nonpartisan organization of 
banking and business experts.”56 
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McCormick carried this effort further during a Thanksgiving Day 
press conference in 1919, where he claimed that “when the original plan 
of the House Bill was conceived, and before Mr. Good fathered it, it was 
the intention of the Bill’s progenitors to create the position of Director of 
the Budget, under the President, to be filled by Mr. Paul Warburg of New 
York.”57 Since Warburg was one of the nation’s most prominent Jewish 
bankers, McCormick’s assertion seemed to compound Allen’s charges of 
corporate conspiracy with a barely concealed layer of anti-Jewish 
innuendo. 
Despite these efforts, the NBC remained committed to the Good Bill 
and the Presidential budget plan, although John T. Pratt and Benjamin 
Strong repeatedly suggested that it might be wise to join forces with the 
Wilson Administration to ensure that advocates of a Congressional budget 
could not get the upper hand. In response to one apparently attractive 
overture by Glass, Stimson urged Pratt and Strong to stick to the plan, and 
not to accept a premature compromise with the Wilson Administration. “I 
cannot join in any suggestion to change the Good Bill, so as to place the 
new machinery in the Treasury Department,” he explained. “It has always 
been my view that the responsibility should rest directly upon the 
President, and the new machinery for that purpose should be directly under 
him.” Stimson also questioned the tactical wisdom of seeking an alliance 
with the Wilson Administration, particularly if it meant accepting a bill 
that did not conform with the committee’s own preferences. “I think it 
would be a serious mistake,” he warned. “It might result in giving 
opponents of budget reform an excuse for sidetracking the whole effort.”58 
Nevertheless, after Senate Hearings on the McCormick Bill 
adjourned in mid-January 1920, the NBC directors were split on the 
question of which bill to support. Among the five original directors, Pratt 
and Strong were still open to a tactical compromise with the Wilson 
Administration while Stimson, Cotton, Warburg, and Samuel McCune 
Lindsay were committed to the Good Bill. Hoping to finally settle the 
question, the NBC employed a freelance researcher to investigate the 
situation on Capitol Hill. The researcher, William O. Heffernan, was a 
Kentucky-born accountant with connections among politicians of the New 
South. Heffernan was a former Budget Commissioner of Ohio and served 
as a director of William H. Allen’s organization, the Institute of Public 
Service, and he seems to have shared Allen’s aversion to the Good Bill. In 
his report, dated January 16, 1920, Heffernan leaned heavily toward 
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endorsing the McCormick Bill, and went out of his way to criticize the 
Good Bill. Heffernan’s main informant was Charles Wallace Collins, the 
author of the McCormick Bill, who, Heffernan nevertheless assured the 
committee, “has no coals in the fire and is a sincere student of the whole 
question.”59 
Collins warned Heffernan that the Good Bill itself was a ruse and 
that, although the Bill appeared to call for an executive budget system, 
there were flaws in the Bill that would make the system unworkable—
flaws that he believed had been inserted deliberately by Good. Heffernan 
reported to the NBC that, according to Collins, “Chairman Good, of the 
House Select Committee on the Budget, although he strongly advocates 
the adoption of a budget system, is alleged to be really opposed to any 
such system.” The Good Bill, Heffernan explained, “was presented to the 
country as something that it wasn’t.”60 
The debate within the National Budget Committee over which bill to 
support continued into March 1920, when the committee received a book 
manuscript commissioned from Frederick A. Cleveland, who had been 
research director for the Taft Commission a decade earlier. Cleveland’s 
work for the Taft Commission had given him some authority on budgeting 
and other administrative matters, but he had not been directly involved in 
the movement for several years. In 1914 and 1915, he had been part of the 
group that established the Institute for Government Research and had 
expected to be named director when the Institute was incorporated, but the 
IGR’s board—dominated by allies of John D. Rockefeller, Jr.—had 
instead selected William Willoughby to lead the new organization. 
Cleveland continued to conduct his research independently in the 
meantime, but he seems to have harbored some lingering bitterness over 
this turn of events.61 
Cleveland’s book, titled The Budget and Responsible Government, 
was published in May 1920, as part of the MacMillan Company’s 
“American Social Progress Series,” edited by NBC research director 
Samuel McCune Lindsay.62 Scholars have tended to rely heavily on this 
volume in their descriptions of the postwar budget movement, but they 
have not noticed that the book presents evidence of the intense contest 
between advocates of the Good Bill and the McCormick Bill and that 
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Cleveland took an active role in these debates. In a key section of the book 
where he compares the various budget bills introduced in Congress, 
Cleveland offers some withering criticisms of the Good Bill in phrasing 
that recalls Charles Wallace Collins’s earlier attacks on Representative 
Good. “One may read it time and again and still be in doubt as to what it 
does aim to accomplish,” Cleveland writes. “The bill holds out the 
appearance of an executive budget measure; but on analysis it is found to 
lack the essentials, and one is left with the conviction that it is a complete 
surrender to . . . the Congressional status quo; that it is essentially a well-
camouflaged legislative budget device . . . .”63 Cleveland focused his 
critique on the wording of several specific clauses and referred to “the 
framers of the bill” with disdain. This suggests he may have been 
motivated in part by his long rivalry with the Good Bill’s author, William 
F. Willoughby. Cleveland was also apparently annoyed that his own 
favored Bill had been ignored.64 However, the intensity of Cleveland’s 
opposition to the Good Bill is striking when compared to his initial 
assessment (made in June 1919, for the directors of the National Budget 
Committee), that the Good Bill was “a long step in the right direction,” 
and it suggests that he had been influenced in the meantime by Glass and 
McCormick.65 
Before publishing the book, the NBC attempted to counterbalance 
Cleveland’s apparent disdain for the Good Bill, which was still favored by 
a majority of the NBC directors, by including an introduction written by 
William Howard Taft. In contrast to Cleveland, the former President 
offered his unequivocal support for the Good Bill. After commending the 
British budget system, Taft lamented the lack of such a system in the 
United States: “Except in the very early days of the Republic, when 
Hamilton, with his wonderful genius, was inaugurating the business side 
of our Government, we never had anything like a proper budget.”66 
Taft then launched directly into the controversy over the competing 
House and Senate bills, drawing on his own experience as President, and 
dismissing the concerns of Treasury advocates that “the President has not 
the time” to manage the budget. “The preparation of the budget is going 
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to be one of the most important functions that the whole Administration 
performs,” Taft insisted. “Therefore, the President may well devote all the 
time that is needed to giving general form to the budget and deciding the 
questions that are certain to arise between his Budget Bureau and the 
departments whose estimates are to be subjected to a pruning.” Echoing 
Stimson’s analysis, Taft argued that it was necessary to have the President 
in charge of this process so that the inevitable disputes between the Budget 
Bureau and the departments could be more readily resolved. The 
President, Taft suggested, “can do it with his power—I doubt if the 
Secretary of the Treasury can.”67 
The stark contrast between Cleveland’s text and Taft’s introduction 
made the volume even more awkward for the NBC. Professor Samuel 
McCune Lindsay attempted to smooth over the difference of opinion 
between Taft and Cleveland in an editor’s note dated March 17, 1920. 
Lindsay’s note offers a glimpse into the continuing debate within the NBC 
over whether to support the Wilson Administration’s plan. “In the ranks 
of the National Budget Committee,” the professor explained, “there 
developed differences of opinion almost from the start concerning the 
relative merits of the proposals for a national budget system, especially 
with respect to the location of the Budget Bureau and the concentrating of 
responsibility for the initiation of the budget.” Lindsay summarized the 
former President’s position: “Mr. Taft is primarily interested in seeing 
executive responsibility fixed and strengthened and therefore naturally 
prefers the Good plan.” And he attempted to summarize the position of the 
former head of Taft’s Commission: “Dr. Cleveland is so much attracted 
by other features of the McCormick plan . . . that he seems to prefer it as 
a whole.” Finally, Lindsay outlined the new official position of the 
National Budget Committee, which by this time included two additional 
directors: New York banker Manny Strauss and Nicholas Murray Butler, 
the president of Columbia University (who was well known as a close ally 
of Stimson’s mentor, Elihu Root). Lindsay explained that the NBC was 
now in favor of “a combination of the two plans in a McCormick–Good 
bill, which may finally be enacted by Congress.”68 
By the time Cleveland’s book appeared, however, the tactical 
situation between the NBC and the Wilson Administration had shifted. On 
February 1, 1920, Carter Glass resigned from the Treasury in order to take 
a seat in the Senate. He was replaced by David Franklin Houston, who had 
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been Wilson’s Secretary of Agriculture. Lacking Glass’s connections in 
financial circles, Houston seems not to have continued his predecessor’s 
efforts to maintain the Administration’s alliance with Senator McCormick 
or to cultivate the leaders of the National Budget Committee. This 
inattention left McCormick vulnerable to persuasion by the NBC and led 
the senator to shift his position on the issue of an independent auditing 
agency. 
In January 1920, before Glass’s resignation, McCormick had told 
William Heffernan that reforming the audit system would be “too great a 
thing to undertake at present” and that this was a rationale for leaving the 
auditing function within the Treasury. McCormick, Heffernan explained 
in his report to the NBC directors, “wants a budget system established first 
and then committees appointed by Congress to study the question of an 
audit. He says that in recommending this he is deferring to the opinion of 
Secretary Glass who should understand the situation.”69 By mid-February, 
however, McCormick had dropped Glass’s insistence on leaving the audit 
within the Treasury and the revised, final version of his Bill called for the 
establishment of an independent auditing agency. This shift brought 
McCormick’s views closer to those of Taft and Stimson, and meant that, 
now, both the House and Senate bills were in conflict with the preferences 
of the Wilson Administration.70 
The Senate approved this version on May 1, 1920, and, two days 
later, a conference committee was formed to reconcile the two conflicting 
bills. When the conferees adjourned three weeks later, on May 26, they 
produced a compromise bill that provided for a Budget Bureau within the 
Department of the Treasury, as specified by the McCormick Bill and 
matching the preference of the Wilson Administration. At the same time, 
however, the final version of the Bill followed the Good Bill’s 
recommendation for an independent audit, contrary to the preference of 
the Wilson Administration. The conference committee’s version of the 
Bill was approved by the Senate on May 27, and by the House on May 
29.71 
Having spent more than half a year insisting that the audit must 
remain within the Treasury, the Wilson Administration was predictably 
                                                     
 69. Heffernan Report, supra note 59. 
 70. Letter from John T. Pratt to Stimson (Feb. 18, 1920) (on file with Yale University Library, 
Stimson Papers 579, reel 54). For McCormick’s initial plan, see McCormick Has Budget System Ready 
for G.O.P., CHI. TRIBUNE, May 19, 1919, at 7. For the final form of his Bill, see MEDILL MCCORMICK, 
NATIONAL BUDGET SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 66-524 (2d Sess. 1920). For a useful narrative focusing on 
the creation of the independent auditing function, see ROGER R. TRASK, DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE 1921–1966, at 23–36 (1996). 
 71. For a useful timeline of the various votes and committee schedules, see generally Charles 
Wallace Collins, Historical Sketch of the Budget Bill in Congress, 2 CONG. DIG. 37 (1922). 
2019] Corporate Lessons for Public Governance 583 
troubled by the Bill’s provision for an independent audit. Treasury 
Secretary Houston suggested to Wilson that there was a rationale for a veto 
in the Bill’s provision for the Comptroller General and Assistant 
Comptroller General to be appointed by the President, but “removable 
only by concurrent resolution of Congress or by impeachment.”72 After 
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer informed Wilson’s personal 
secretary that this provision was “clearly unconstitutional,” the budget 
Bill, with Wilson’s veto, was returned to Congress on June 4, 1920, the 
second-to-last day of the session.73 
Wilson and his supporters framed the veto as a defense of executive 
prerogative and as the result of the President’s strict constitutionalist 
scruples, and advocates of budgetary reform assured the public that the 
provision of the Bill at issue was a mere technicality. But the focus, by 
contemporary observers as well as by subsequent scholars, on the 
constitutionality of the removal provision for the Comptroller General has 
obscured the fact that Wilson and his Administration had a record of 
opposing the creation of an independent audit.74 
By contrast, the leaders of the National Budget Committee—drawing 
from their experience in corporate governance—viewed the independent 
audit as a source of real power and prerogative for the President. By 
emulating corporate practice and having a non-executive actor assess the 
executive’s actions, they argued, an independent audit would solidify the 
executive, in its role as administrator, and the Legislature, in its role as 
observer and critic. They viewed such a system as an essential prerequisite 
for carrying out national policy.75 
Wilson’s veto ensured that the budget was at issue in the 1920 
presidential election. The leaders of the NBC were initially disappointed 
with the nomination of Warren G. Harding, but as the Republican 
candidate spent the late summer of 1920 in consultation and negotiation 
with party leaders, he also received weekly lessons in governmental theory 
from Columbia professor Samuel McCune Lindsay, who was research 
director for the National Budget Committee. Near the end of August, 
Harding met with NBC chairman Pratt and assured him that, if elected, he 
would support the NBC’s proposals. In October, an article appeared under 
Harding’s signature in the election-eve edition of The World’s Work. One 
                                                     
 72. Letter from David Franklin Houston to Joseph Patrick Tumulty (June 3, 1920), in 65 THE 
PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 358 (Arthur S. Link ed., 1991). For Houston’s own explanation of his 
reasoning, see generally 2 DAVID F. HOUSTON, EIGHT YEARS WITH WILSON’S CABINET, 1913 TO 
1920: WITH A PERSONAL ESTIMATE OF THE PRESIDENT 82–90 (1926). 
 73. See THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON, supra note 72, at 361–63. 
 74. An exception is Skowronek’s discussion of the veto. SKOWRONEK, supra note 7, at 207. 
 75. On the questions of an independent audit, see supra notes 22, 32, 43, 54, 70–74 and 
accompanying text. 
584 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 42:565 
of the only substantive statements in the article was Harding’s pledge to 
enact a national budget system. World’s Work editor Arthur W. Page, who 
had commissioned the article, described it to Henry Stimson as an effort 
to force the senator to commit himself publicly to the NBC’s agenda.76 
In April 1921, during the first weeks of the 67th Congress, the House 
again passed the Good Bill and the Senate again passed the McCormick 
Bill.77 In May, the competing bills were sent, again, to a conference 
committee, which again produced a compromise Bill. The new budget Bill 
was similar to the one passed the previous year, but with two significant 
changes. First, in repudiation of Wilson’s veto, the new Bill made the new 
Comptroller General even harder to remove, providing the officer with a 
fifteen-year term, with removal possible only through a joint resolution of 
Congress.78 Second, where the previous year’s version had made the 
Secretary of the Treasury the director of the budget, with an assistant 
director of the budget, and left it up to the President to decide which one 
should exercise budget authority, the new version specified that the 
director of the Bureau would be the director of the budget, responsible 
directly to the President, thus bypassing the Secretary of the Treasury.79 
On June 9, 1921, the day before signing the Budget and Accounting 
Act, Harding offered the job of Director of the Budget to General Charles 
Gates Dawes, a Chicago banker with connections to J.P. Morgan and 
Company.80 Harding and Dawes immediately set about strengthening the 
position of the Budget Bureau as a presidential staff agency. At Dawes’s 
suggestion, Harding signed nine executive orders creating new agencies 
that Dawes called “coordinating machinery” to facilitate the work of the 
Bureau.81 These included the Federal Purchasing Board, the Federal 
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Liquidation Board, the Corps Area Co-ordinators, the Surveyor General 
of Real Estate, the Federal Motor Transport Agent, the Federal Traffic 
Board, the Federal Board of Hospitalization, the Federal Specialization 
Board, and the Interdepartmental Board of Contracts.82 
As they implemented the Budget Act, Dawes and Harding held to the 
business analogy that had animated the administrative reform movement 
from the beginning. Dawes’s memoranda to Harding were typically filled 
with statements such as: “The government as a business organization must 
function as a business organization, with the lines of authority proceeding 
as they do in the ordinary corporation.”83 Although Dawes and Harding—
in their public statements at the time—often chose to emphasize the 
monetary savings that had been achieved through the budget system, they 
clearly viewed administrative rationalization as the Bureau’s most 
important legacy. Ten months into his tenure, in a personal letter to the 
editor of the Saturday Evening Post, Dawes summarized what he viewed 
as the chief contributions of the Budget Bureau. These included: “the 
imposition of central policy in routine business,” the creation of “the 
superimposed coordinating machinery in the hands of the President,” and 
the clarification of the role of Cabinet members, who “as the 
administrators of routine business . . . must be subordinate at all times to 
the President and to the coordinating machinery created by him for the 
transmission of a unified business program.”84 
In June 1922, near the end of the second session of the sixty-seventh 
Congress, Ogden Livingston Mills, a former Wall Street lawyer and now 
the Republican representative for the seventeenth district of New York—
a district which, at that time, included Central Park and the Upper East 
Side—sent a letter to his constituents, summarizing the achievements of 
the previous year. After discussing the spending reductions achieved 
through the new budget system, Mills wrote a statement that captured the 
ambitions of the reformers: 
The President, ably assisted by General Dawes, has not only used the 
Bureau as a supervising agency in the interest of economy, but as a 
coordinating force, and has succeeded in unifying the divergent 
tendencies which existed among different departments and in 
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bringing about the spirit of co-operation and the common purpose 
that characterize the organization of our most successful 
corporations.85 
Mills’s appraisal was echoed by scholars of public administration. 
Later in 1922, William F. Willoughby of the Institute for Government 
Research remarked that the budget system “definitely installs the President 
into the new position of general manager of the government as a business 
organization” and that it gives the President “an agency through which he 
could meet his new obligations as commander-in-chief of the 
administrative forces.”86 Public administration pioneer Leonard D. White, 
in the 1926 edition of his textbook, Introduction to the Study of Public 
Administration, wrote: 
[The Budget Bureau] gives the promise of developing into a 
permanent and effective staff for the President. After long discussion 
the Bureau was attached by law to the treasury department, but from 
its foundation it has consistently viewed itself as the President’s 
direct agency for making his influence a real one in the business 
activities of the government.87 
Scholars of public administration have long acknowledged that, in its 
early years, many of the founders of their discipline embraced the analogy 
between business and government. Leonard White’s use of the phrase 
“business activities of the government” is a good example of this.88 That 
White and others began to abandon that analogy during the 1930s is taken 
as evidence that scholars of public administration were beginning to 
professionalize and modernize.89 However, what is often missed is that, 
during the New Era, it was not only scholars who were struck by the 
resemblance between the federal government and the large national 
corporations that had come to dominate the American economy during the 
previous quarter century. As Robert Catherwood, president of the National 
Civil Service Reform League, explained in a speech titled The United 
States Government: The Greatest Industrial Concern in the World: 
Take the first half dozen biggest industrial concerns in the country, 
put them together, and the United States is a bigger industrial concern 
than the lot of them. The government builds and maintains ships, 
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aeroplanes, dams, highways, ports, waterways, harbors, public 
buildings, bridges, fortifications, and penal and charitable 
institutions, and manufactures a list of 70,000 articles from apple jelly 
to zylophilogistic specimens. The government is the biggest banker, 
the biggest bond house, the largest carpenter, power concern, 
dredger, cement user, printer, and lithographer in the country. The 
combined faculties of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Michigan, Chicago, 
Northwestern, Wisconsin, and Stanford are less than the scientific 
faculty of the Department of Agriculture. The United States is not 
only the largest employer of labor in the world, but the largest 
industrial, scientific, and social concern going.90 
Acknowledging the ubiquity of the business-government analogy in 
the days before the New Deal helps explain the motivations of the leaders 
of the National Budget Committee and other reformers. If the government 
is a business, then the logical conclusion is that it should be run using 
modern business methods. 
The business-government analogy can also help historians identify 
instructive episodes to examine. While historians of politics and policy 
have generally lacked interest in the origins of the national budget system, 
business historians have long noted that, as Alfred D. Chandler and Fritz 
Redlich once wrote, “the first appearance of a budget in business 
enterprise cannot be overestimated in its historical importance. It is an 
indicator of emerging bureaucratization of business.”91 This suggests that 
the story behind the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 ought to be 
central to historians’ understanding of the development of the modern 
American state. 
Studying this story provides a good example of the central role that 
corporate lawyers played in public policy debates in the first years after 
World War I, and it usefully illustrates the significance of their agenda and 
the scope of their ambitions. The opposition that their proposals 
provoked—from populist Congressmen as well as progressive officers in 
the Wilson Administration—shows that they were not simply pursuing a 
moderate consensus. 
Throughout the debate, the leaders of the National Budget 
Committee argued that one of the chief benefits of a Presidential budget 
system would be the creation of a presidential staff agency. They 
continued this quest after the creation of the Budget Bureau. In 1921, the 
NBC published, in book form, its plan to increase the managerial power 
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of the president by “giving to the President the machinery which he must 
have in order to perform effectively the functions of the chief 
administrative officer of the Government.”92 They proposed to do this 
through reorganization of the executive branch, and their 
recommendations formed the basis of the reorganization plan presented to 
Congress by the Harding Administration in 1923. Among other changes, 
that plan included a proposal to move the Budget Bureau from the 
Department of the Treasury to the Office of the President. This idea 
naturally provoked opposition in Congress, and the Harding plan never 
came to a vote.93 The NBC leaders’ vision of a true presidential staff office 
would not be fully realized until after the reform efforts of the New Deal-
era Brownlow Committee and the post-World War II Hoover 
Commissions.94 
As in the budget debates, some policymakers—particularly farm-
state Congressmen—charged that the NBC’s executive reorganization 
proposals were a stalking horse for a corporate conspiracy. In 1926, in 
response to a query from Yale Law School Dean Thomas Swan about the 
possibilities for securing passage of an executive reorganization plan, John 
T. Pratt described this as one of the primary roadblocks facing reformers. 
“From my experience,” Pratt wrote, “I am very firmly convinced that 
nothing can be done along the line of reorganizing the Government, 
without a great deal of work and without the backing of all possible 
organizations likely to be at all interested, particularly the farm group.”95 
However, the NBC’s failure to overcome these political obstacles created 
an opening for academic experts. As corporate lawyers such as Pratt and 
Stimson began to demure from engaging in debates about administrative 
reform, they began to be replaced by scholars in the emerging discipline 
of public administration studies such as Leonard White, Charles Merriam, 
and Louis Brownlow—the men to whom Franklin Roosevelt would turn 
when he sought to increase the managerial capacity of the executive 
branch in 1936.96 
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This story also puts Adolf Berle’s dual status as both corporate 
lawyer and academic expert into a new context. With one foot on each side 
of the divide between the old world of corporate elite-backed reform and 
the emerging world of academic reform, Berle was uniquely positioned to 
take a leading role in policy debates during the New Deal and after. As a 
successful member of the corporate bar, Berle could not simply be 
dismissed as an idealistic academic by observers who were nostalgic for 
the days of the NBC. Conversely, as a university professor engaged in 
scientific study of the problem of corporate power in American society, 
Berle could not be dismissed as a throwback to the patrician citizens 
reform committees of old. 
